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In the future, and to the greatest extent possible, Sara Lee will be a
virtual company, putting its virtual name on things it doesn't make.'
Before Manville, big businesses paid their tort liabilities. In its 1982
bankruptcy reorganization, Manville's investors lost nearly the entire value of
the company-over $2 billion-to tort creditors. The damages from Union
Carbide's 1984 release of toxic chemicals that killed 4000 people in Bhopal,
India were estimated in the billions of dollars before the courts came to Union
Carbide's rescue. The following year, A.H. Robins took a $2.5 billion hit
from Dalkon Shield claimants,4 and a Texas jury awarded Pennzoil $11 billion
in a tort case against Texaco.5 In 1989, the Exxon Valdez spilled oil that led
to over $9 billion in judgments against Exxon.6 Now, the tobacco companies'
tort liabilities are estimated in the hundreds of billions.7 These cases mark a
historic shift in the nature and magnitude of liability.
In Corporate Judgment Proofing,' Professor James J. White argues-and
indeed claims to have proven empirically-that big businesses have erected no
legal defenses in response. To do so, he argues, would have been futile. The
companies' lenders and trading partners would not have permitted it.9 The
courts would have disregarded limited liability and deemed the companies'
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every move a fraudulent conveyance.'0 Public outrage and government
retaliation would have followed."
The occasion for Professor White's observations is the publication of my
article The Death of Liability in 1996."2 In that article, I predicted that
individuals and businesses of all sizes would increasingly defeat their liability
by judgment proofing their operations. The legal structures by which they
would accomplish that would have one thing in common: The entities engaging
in activities that could potentially generate significant liabilities would not own
substantial unencumbered assets. Ownership of assets would accumulate only
in entities with little potential to generate liabilities. As a result, I predicted the
American economy was evolving toward a future in which:
There will be entities that own things and entities that do things.
Those that own things-the bankruptcy remote vehicles-will not do
anything, lest they expose their assets to liability. Those that do
things-the operating companies-will not own anything, lest their
judgment creditors have something to attach.' 3
In this future, plaintiffs would no longer sue for money judgments because
they could not collect. The liability system would no longer serve any purpose
and would die.
White omits from his description of my thesis all mention of
computerization-the driving force behind the death of liability"4-and
instead strains to make judgment proofing by large corporations the issue. 5
In his view, "Most individuals have always been judgment proof, and few
private companies can cause sufficient statutory or tortious liability to cause
a significant social problem."' 6 The judgment proofing of the remaining
individuals and private companies in the American economy is "a problem of
10. See id. at 1405-1407.
I1. See id. at 1411-1412.
12. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. I (1996).
13. Id. at 28.
14. Computerization only recently made it possible to divide the investment risks and rewards
associated with a business in complex, nonintuitive ways, leading to trading in derivatives. Computerization
is now making it possible to address separately each of the variety of purposes served by the ownership
of assets. In the modem public company, the ownership of unencumbered assets assures creditors of
payment, provides liquidity, absorbs risk, stabilizes the business financially, reduces contracting and other
transaction costs, makes the business an attractive place for managers to work, and qualifies the company
to raise growth capital in financial markets. The perfection of new devices to address each of these needs
will free the business of tomorrow from the need to own unencumbered assets and in doing so, free it from
liability. For example, computerization can facilitate risk-absorbing mechanisms such as guarantees,
payment insurance, and letters of credit that insure payment to contractual stakeholders.
15. To achieve his focus, Professor White first argues that I "should be concerned principally with
injuries caused by business enterprises, not with torts by individuals" because "[it is a rare individual who
can cause enough personal injury or property damage to make it worth his while to escape liability." White,
supra note 8, at 1366. As I stated in The Death of Liability, "Judgment proofing is less common among
large businesses." LoPucki, supra note 12, at 19.
16. White, supra note 8, at 1367.
[Vol. 107: 14131414
Virtual Judgment Proofing
modest social consequence."' 7  With this argument, Professor White
essentially concedes my thesis with respect to individuals.
White has chosen his ground wisely, because the judgment proofing of
individuals appears to be in rapid acceleration. The Death of Liabilit, describes
the decade-old boom in offshore "asset-protection trusts"-devices sited in
offshore havens but widely promoted here as an effective means for Americans
to render themselves judgment proof.'8 "Asset-protection trust" is merely a
euphemism for "self-settled spendthrift trust." Self-settled spendthrift trusts are,
in essence, private declarations by property owners that they will retain full use
and control of their assets, but that their judgment creditors will not be able to
reach them. Not surprisingly, the law in the United States has long been that
self-settled spendthrift trusts are void as against public policy.'9
As the offshore asset-protection trust industry prospered, U.S. banks and
trust companies became envious. Six months after publication of The Death of
Liability, Alaska became the first state to recognize self-settled spendthrift
trusts.20 Americans can now judgment proof themselves without transferring
their money and the titles to their properties to strangers offshore. 2' The situs
provisions of the new law are tailored to make these trusts available, not just
to residents of Alaska, but to residents of all states. Within a few months,
Delaware became the second state to permit the establishment of self-settled
spendthrift trusts. 2 2 These laws mark a historic change in the policy of
American jurisdictions toward judgment proofing.
I. THE FINANCIAL DATA ON CORPORATE JUDGMENT PROOFING
By relying on Compustat data,23 Professor White narrows his attack to
only the largest public companies. The move excludes from consideration over
17. Id. at 1367.
18. LoPucki, supra note 12. at 32-38.
19. See Elena Marty-Nelson, Offshore Asset Protrection Trusts: Having )bur Cake and Eating It Too.
47 RUTGERS L. REV. 11, 28-56 (1994).
20. See Alaska Trust Act. 1997 Alaska Sess. Laws A.L.S. ch. 6. § 7 (codified at ALASKA STAT §
34.40.110 (Michie Supp. 1997)); see also Jonathan G. Blattmachr & Howard M. Zantsky. Estate Planning
iith Alaska Trusts, PROBATE PRAC., Sept. 1997. at I. I ("The new Alaska rule is simildr to that adopted
in many foreign jurisdictions in that the interest of the grantor is not subject to the claims of the grantor's
creditors unless the transfer in trust was fraudulent.").
21. See Lynn Asinof, Protection of Offshore Trusts Coies Onshore in Two States, WALL ST J . July
23, 1997, at Cl.
22. See Qualified Dispositions in Trust Act. 71 Del. Laws A.L.S. ch. 159 (1997) (to be codified at
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §§ 3570-3576). Delaware's product is markedly inferior for judgment.proofing
purposes because the spendthrift features of the law are not intended to be effective against tort creditors
See Blattmachr & Zaritsky, supra note 20. at 5.
23. See White, supra note 8. at 1370 n.38.
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99.9% of the firms in the American economy.24 But even with respect to
those companies, none of his Compustat data contradicts my thesis.
A. Secured Debt to Assets
White claims to disprove the thesis that public companies increasingly use
secured debt strategies. 25 That was not, however, a thesis I have ever
advanced. As I stated in The Death of Liability, "Secured debt strategies...
are employed primarily by small, relatively uncreditworthy businesses, '2 6 and
"when large businesses do judgment proof, they use different techniques, 27
which I identified as parent-subsidiary and asset-securitization strategies.2"
White admits that he is unable to test empirically for parent-subsidiary
judgment proofing,29 and he has not responded at all to the data I presented
on asset securitization. 0
B. Assets to Liabilities
For similar reasons, White's data regarding asset-to-liability ratios add
little or nothing. As he himself observes, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) data on which Compustat is based are consolidated for all
members of the corporate group.3' That data shows the aggregate assets and
aggregate liabilities for the group, but does not show the assets or liabilities of
any member of the group. If a tort-risk-generating subsidiary had assets of $1
million, while its non-risk-generating parent had assets of $99 million, the
financial data on this group would show assets of $100 million. Assuming that
the courts would respect the subsidiary's formal status as a separate entity, this
corporate group would have only $1 million in assets exposed to liability. Yet,
24. The Compustat database contains data on only about 7000 to 9000 companies. Those companies
were selected by Standard & Poors, the compilers of Compustat, for their prominence from the
approximately 16,000 public companies filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. Dun &
Bradstreet reports on approximately 10 million companies. See DUN & BRADSTREET, YOUR MEMBrERStIP
JusT GOT MORE MEMORABLE (1997). White attempts to compensate for this large-company bias by
selecting the "200 smallest" companies in Compustat. White, supra note 8, at 1372. But by rerunning
White's query, I determined that in 1996, the largest of the "200 smallest" as defined by Professor White
was Smith Corona Corp., with assets of $83 million. White's reference to such companies as "small
companies" is misleading. Id. at 1372.
25. See White, supra note 8, at 1374.
26. LoPucki, supra note 12, at 14.
27. Id. at 19.
28. See id. at 19-30. Public companies do not use secured financing because they can accomplish
precisely the same thing using a parent-subsidiary strategy with the valuable assets and the preferred
creditors in the subsidiary. See id. at 20-21.
29. See White, supra note 8, at 1388.
30. See LoPucki, supra note 12, at 24 (illustrating the rapid rise in securitized debt as a percentage
of all consumer debt).
31. See White, supra note 8, at 1388 & n.97.
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if the group had no debt, White's criteria would recommend this company as
a perfect example of the absence of judgment proofing-S 100 million in assets
and no liabilities.
Nor will the effects of asset securitization show up in the asset-to-liability
ratios of judgment-proofed companies. In The Death of Liability, I used the
example of a hypothetical firm that I called "Zero Asset Exxon":
Through a series of asset securitizations, Exxon Corporation disposes
of all of its assets. As the cash from these transactions becomes
available, Exxon distributes the cash to its shareholders in the form of
dividends, leaving the company with neither assets nor liabilities....
Because Exxon contracts to continue use of each asset even as Exxon
sells it, the operations of Zero-Asset Exxon remain exactly as they
were when it was a multibillion dollar company. But ... Zero-Asset
Exxon is now judgment proof.32
Zero-Asset Exxon has neither assets nor liabilities, so it has no asset-to-liability
ratio. But it can easily achieve one-whatever ratio the judgment proofer
pleases-simply by acquiring nominal assets and even more nominal liabilities.
For example, if Zero-Asset Exxon acquired $100,000 in assets and $20,000 in
debt, it would have a healthy asset-to-liability ratio of five to one. But for all
practical purposes, it would remain judgment proof. The point is that asset-to-
liability ratios can tell us little or nothing about the kinds of judgment proofing
I predicted in The Death of Liability.
Nor, perhaps, can any Compustat data alone. Public companies are not
simply private companies that have registered with the SEC; they are public
for a specific purpose-to raise capital in public markets. To enter those
markets and remain viable in them, the companies are expected to maintain
certain financial ratios. The public company that judgment proofs itself with
secured debt does not achieve the expected ratios. That does not mean,
however, that the public company simply absorbs whatever liability is
associated with the industry in which it is engaged. The public company can
use an inverted parent-subsidiary strategy that is the equivalent of secured
debt,33 or can cause the liability to be generated in an independent entity that
is unable to pay it.34
32. LoPucki, supra note 12, at 26.
33. See id. at 20-21.
34. For example, when governments imposed multibillion dollar liability on oil shipping. the reaction
of some large oil companies was to divest themselves of their shipping subsidiane, See William J Cook.
An Easy Way out of This Mess. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.. June 25. 1990. at 14. 14 I reporling a decision
by the Royal Dutch/Shell Oil Company to ship oil to the United States on independent tankers Irlather
than risk being stuck" with liabilities for cleaning up any possible spills). When asbcsto, proved
unreasonably dangerous, the largest companies left the industry to smaller ones. See Asbestos Settlenent.
CHI. TRiB., Apr. 11, 1992, at I (discussing Keene Corp.); Manvillc Asbestos Bil Paid. S F EXAMINER.
March 8, 1991, at B5 (discussing Manville): Amy Dockser Marcus & Susan C Faludi. U.S Confhct
Claimed in Waste Cleanup, WALL ST. J.. July 10. 1991. at B2 (discussing Fibreboard). The liability-
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Even if the public company must surrender a particular activity to separate,
private owners, the public company can continue to profit from it. This has
occurred, for example, with "independent" automobile dealerships, gas stations,
and other kinds of franchises. 5 The law has been remarkably tolerant. For
example, in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Bransford6 the plaintiff was assaulted in a
Mobil Mini Mart by a station employee. Mobil was the owner of the property,
its products were sold in the Mobil Mini Mart, its contract with its franchisee
required that the franchisee display Mobil's logos, its franchisee did in fact
display them, and Mobil sent its representatives to the station to provide
various support services. The employee was wearing the Mobil logo on his
clothing when he attacked the plaintiff. Noting that the franchise agreement
referred to the franchisee as an "independent businessman," however, the
Supreme Court of Florida entered summary judgment in favor of Mobil." In
effect, the court ruled that a franchisor cannot be held liable for the torts of its
franchisee. Thus, public companies can divest themselves of liabilities simply
by franchising the liability-generating aspects of their businesses.
The comparative advantages of public companies in raising capital and
private companies in judgment proofing suggest that public and private
companies may find it advantageous to work together. That is, public
companies will raise the capital and own the assets that are deployed by
private "partners." Such "partnerships"-in the form of franchisor-franchisee,
lessor-lessee, or lender-borrower-may completely frustrate the liability system
without the judgment proofing of any public companies. 38 These facts cast
doubt on White's belief that "data from private companies would be no
different."39
C. The Bankruptcy Data
Because trustees in bankruptcy cases have essentially the same rights to
generating activities have continued, but the companies continuing them have fewer assets and so have
fewer assets at risk. For the system as a whole, the effect of divestiture is identical to judgment proofing.
35. See, e.g., Murphy v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 219 S.E.2d 874 (Va. 1975) (holding that the use of the
licensor's name on a motel did not subject the licensor to liability).
36. 648 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1995).
37. Id. at 121.
38. For an example of such a "partnership," see the discussion of Rockefeller Center Properties infra
notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
39. White, supra note 8, at 1412. Empirical research on the financial structure of corporations is based
almost entirely on public company data. No source of data on private companies is readily available. There
is reason to believe, however, that private companies are different. In our empirical study of the bankruptcy
reorganization of large publicly held companies, Professor William Whitford and I found that when a single
shareholder owned a clearly controlling interest of an insolvent company, management continued to
represent the interests of shareholders. The same was not true of corporations with widely dispersed
shareholdings. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in the Bankruptcy
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 669, 742-47 (1993).
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assets as do judgment creditors,40 the amounts recovered by trustees are
indicative of the amounts available to judgment creditors. In The Death of
Liability, I presented data showing that the percentage of no-asset bankruptcy
estates-that is, the percentage of debtors fully judgment proof at the moment
of bankruptcy filing-increased from less than 50% in the 1920s to 95% in
1991 and 1992 .
Apparently having forgotten that The Death of Liability was about personal
and corporate judgment proofing, White charges that I 'distort[) the data on
bankruptcy by drawing inferences about judgment proofing from data compiled
mostly from personal bankruptcies. '" 2 White then attempts to dismiss the
increase in the proportion of no asset estates as resulting merely from an
increase in the proportion of nonbusiness bankruptcies from 87% in 1980 to
over 95% in 1996.13 A historical quirk in the data, however, makes it possible
to demonstrate that White's dismissal is unwarranted. The increase in the
proportion of nonbusiness bankruptcies has not been relentless over time. That
proportion was at 92% for a period in the late 1960s," declined thereafter,
and again reached 92% in 1991-1992-the years covered by the General
Accounting Office study that presents the only data point on bankruptcy
dividends since 1976."5 Thus, we have data on the recoveries of bankruptcy
trustees in two periods, separated by twenty-five years, in which the
proportions of business and nonbusiness bankruptcies were virtually identical.
In both years of the earlier period-1967 and 1968-unsecured creditors
received dividends in 12% and 13% of liquidating bankruptcies." In the later
period- 1991-1992-they received dividends in only 3% of liquidating
bankruptcies. 7 Whatever may account for that decline in recoveries, it was
not merely a decline in the proportion of business bankruptcies.
40. See I1 U.S.C. § 544(a)(l)-(2) (1994) (givmg the trustee the rights of an ideal judgment lien
creditor).
41. See LoPucki, supra note 12. at 18.
42. White, supra note 8, at 1370 n.37 (citation omitted).
43. See id. at 1379.
44. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, TABLES OF BA.KRt PTCY STAnsTIcS 5 (1978)
[hereinafter TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICSI (reporting proportions of 91.5% for cases filed in 1966
and 92.0% for cases filed in 1967).
45. See American Bankruptcy Institute, U.S. Bankruptcv Filing. 1980.1996 (Busineii. Nn-Bunnes,.
Total) (visited Dec. 8, 1997) <http:flwww.abiworld.orglstaisl1980annual.html> (reporting proportions of
91.72% for cases filed in 1990 and 92.42% for cases filed in 1991). Filing data from the year prior to the
closing data is used because the modal time from filing to closing is one )car
46. See TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS. supra note 44. at 9 (counting, for 1967. 19.144 asset
cases, 22,371 nominal asset cases, and 118.641 no asset cases, and for 1968, 21.360 asset cases, 24.330
nominal asset cases, and 118,716 no asset cases). As with the 1990s data. filing data from the year prior
to the closing data is used because the modal time from filing to closing is one year. See U S GE.N
ACCOUNT'ING OFFICE, CASE RECEIPTS PAID TO CREDITORS AND PROFESSIONALS 9 (W94) thereinafter GAO
REPoRT].
47. See TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS. supra note 44. at 5
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None of Professor White's alternative explanations plausibly explains the
precipitous decline in bankruptcy payouts.48 The best remaining explanation
is that the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code were successful in their
effort to reduce the costs and increase the reliability of security interests.
Debtors encumbered more of their assets, leaving less for potential judgment
creditors.
D. Insurance
Professor White admits that his argument from the insurance data rests on
the assumption that "the [liability] losses generated by American business are
more or less proportional to business activity (as measured by GDP)., 49 Yet
the fifteen-year period he examines includes the "litigation explosion" of the
1980s-a period of rapid increase in environmental, products, and other kinds
48. Professor White offers four other explanations. None has merit. First, White suggests a possible
increase in business losses in Chapter II cases. Without citing any evidence, Professor White asserts that
current bankruptcy reorganization law is overly permissive, allowing debtors to lose in continuing
operations the assets that would otherwise have been paid to unsecured creditors. See White, supra note
8, at 1379 n.54. What evidence exists suggests the contrary. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stephan
Sundgren, Is Chapter II Too Favorable to Debtors? Evidence from Abroad, 82 CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming March 1998) (suggesting Chapter I I yields a net gain to unsecured creditors). Even if White's
assertion were true, it could not account for any substantial portion of the decline in the proportion of
dividend-paying liquidations, because Chapter I I cases were only about 2,8% of the bankruptcy cases filed
in the relevant years. See NEW GENERATION RESEARCH, INC., THE BANKRUPTCY YEARBOOK & ALMANAC
32 (1997) (reporting that 17,684 of the 613,465 cases filed in 1988 were under Chapter I I and 18,281 of
the 679,461 cases filed in 1989 were under Chapter 1I). Cases filed two years before 1991-1992 are used
because most of the asset bankruptcies reported in the 1991-1992 data were cases pending between one and
three years. See GAO REPORT, supra note 46, at 44.
Second, White imagines a possible increase in the expenses of bankruptcy administration. See White,
supra note 8, at 1379 n.54. Professor White's argument is contrary to the data. In 1991-1992, only 5% of
bankruptcy estates had any assets in them at all from which expenses of administration could be paid. See
GAO REPORT, supra note 46, at 1-2. The corresponding figures for the years 1940 to the end of record
keeping in 1977, were between 24% and 35%. See TABLES OF BANKRUPTCY STATISTICS, supra note 44,
at 5 (providing data for the years from 1940 to 1977). Had no expenses of administration been paid at all,
unsecured creditors would thus have received dividends of between 24% and 35% of bankruptcy cases from
1940 to 1977, while that was true of only 5% of bankruptcy cases in 1991-1992. See LoPucki, supra note
12, at 18. Therefore, the possible increase in expenses of administration Professor White hypothesizes
cannot explain the precipitous decline in bankruptcy payouts.
Third, White considers a possible change in the timing of bankruptcy filings. He observes that if
companies declared Chapter I I early in their financial difficulties under one regime and later under another,
"the distribution to creditors would be different under the two regimes." White, supra note 8, at 1379 n.54.
The trouble with his argument is that in historical context, it cuts the wrong way. Today's debtors are
quicker, rather than slower, to file bankruptcy. Delay in filing bankruptcy results in reductions, not
increases, in the amounts of assets available to unsecured creditors. Thus, if Professor White's argument
were correct, bankruptcy dividends would be higher today rather than lower, as observed.
Fourth, White argues that bankruptcy and state exemptions increased in 1978 and 1994. See id. at
1380. The simple answer to the doubling of exemption amounts in 1994 is that it occurred after the 1926
to 1992 increase in judgment proofing, and hence cannot possibly explain it. By the first data point after
the 1978 increase in federal personal exemptions, 1991-1992, some 39 of the 48 states had exercised their
right to opt out of those changes, see ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, TilE LAW OF
DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 226-27 (1991), and the dollar amounts had been severely eroded by inflation.
Many states increased their exemption amounts from 1976 to 1992, but White offers no evidence that the
increases exceeded inflation.
49. White, supra note 8, at 1381.
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of commercial liability, as well as the birth of the "mass tort."'  Not only did
the number of commercial tort cases increase at rates well in excess of gross
domestic product (GDP),"1 the verdicts in those cases also increased at rates
in excess of GDP, 52 causing total commercial tort liability to increase
geometrically. Only automobile liability-a category Professor White excludes
from his data-lagged behind GDP.5 3 The more plausible explanation for
White's data is that the aggregate liability imposed on American businesses
increased at a rate considerably more rapid than GDP growth from 1981 to
1996, but insurance companies paid a considerably lower proportion of those
claims. The erosions in insurance coverage during that period were so large
they nearly offset the entire litigation explosion.
E. Subsidiaries
In The Death of Liability, I defined judgment proofing to include any
strategy that had the effect of denying satisfaction of a plaintiff's judgment."
My definition includes "soft" judgment proofing that merely limits liability
along with "hard" judgment proofing that "aims at denying all recovery to
every plaintiff' because both externalize at least a portion of the cost of a
company's economic activity.56
Rather than accept that every use of limited liability is "judgment
proofing" because it defeats judgments, actual or potential, White redefines the
50. See Richard A. Seltzer. Punitive Damages in Mfass Tort Litigution. 52 FORDIIA\I L Rt-v 37
(1983) ("Mass tort litigation in the 1980's has reached unprecedented levels '*).
51. See. e.g., PATRICIA DANZON, NEW EVIDE.NCE ON Tin. FREQLENCY AND SE' .RITy Of. NIIC.L
MALPRACTICE CLAIMs at vii (1986) (finding that claim frequency per physician gres% at roughl) 104 per
year from 1975 to 1984). Professor White cites Deborah R Hensler. Trends in Tort Lsinoton Findins
from the Institute for Civil Justice's Research. 48 OHIO ST L.J. 479 (1987). for the proposition ttat there
was a five-fold increase in product liability suits from 1975 to 1985 See White. supra note 8. at 1367 n 22
52. See DANZON, supra note 51. at vii (finding that the a\erage payment per claim against physicians
grew at twice the rate of inflation from 1975 to 1984): JAMES S KAKAIJK & NicItot.AS M\I PA(-t. COSTS
AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITGATION 15 (1986) (finding that the aserage annual rate of grouth
in total expenditures, nationwide, to compensate tort claims, excluding transaction costs. from 1981 to 1985.
was about 12% for automobile accident claims and about 17% for non-automobilc claims. .. hile the
Consumer Price Index grew at about 7%); Theodore Eisenberg & James A Henderson. Jr. Inside the Quiet
Revolution in Products Liabilirv. 39 UCLA L. REv. 731. 764-65. 767 (1992) (sho%%ing increases in products
liability awards from the early to late 1980s, measured in constant dollars).
53. See Hensler. supra note 51. at 482 (reporting that "lautomobile cascs are characterized by
stability; products liability, malpractice, and other non-auto cases are grosving at a substantial rate")
54. The "growth of insured losses incurred" marches relentlessly upward on Whiie's graph only
because he cuts off at 1995. See White. supra note 8. at 1381 For example, the 1996 medical malpractice
data show a decline in losses covered, not just as a percentage of GDP. but also in absolute dollar amount
See A.M. BEST Co., BEST'S AGGREGATES AND AVERAGES. PRO'ERTY-CAStAtTY 164-65 (1997)
[hereinafter BEST'S AGGREGATES]. This trend reversal is corroborated by data on the linits of liability
insurance purchased in 1996. See MARSH & MCCLEINNAN. St'RVEY oi" LIABiity Ltits Pt RCIIASED BY
MARSH & MCLENNAN CLIENTS 3 (1996) (showing a decrease dunng the 1995 calendar )ear in the a%erage
limits of liability insurance purchased by the 397 Marsh & McLennan clients suth annual reenues bctseen
$500 million and $10 billion).
55. See LoPucki, supra note 1, at 4 n.4.
56. Id. at 47.
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term. Under his definition, an entity is judgment proof "only if the managers
knowingly operate with a sum of free assets and insurance coverage that is less
than the present value of the firm's expected liabilities.' 57 White himself
suggests the example of a firm whose operations pose a one-in-ten-thousand
risk of inflicting a catastrophe in ten years. Merely adding dollar amounts to
his example exposes the extremity of his position. If the firm posed a one-in-
ten-thousand risk of inflicting $100 million in damages and decided to operate
with no assets and only $10,000 in liability insurance, White would say that
the firm was not judgment proof and the managers had not engaged in
judgment proofing. Under White's formula, Union Carbide, Texaco, and Exxon
could have deliberately structured their companies to limit their liability to
under 1% of the damage they inflicted, without having engaged in "judgment
proofing."
The fallacy of White's position becomes apparent when we consider a
world in which there are 10,000 such companies. In the aggregate, these firms
would be expected to cause one $100 million catastrophe over the ten year
period. If each firm maintained only the minimum insurance White would
require to avoid "judgment proofing," the total insurance available to
compensate for that catastrophe would be $10,000. In that world, 99.99% of
tort liability would go uncompensated even though nobody was guilty of
"judgment proofing."
Redefining judgment proofing will not prevent strategies of the kind
described here from undermining and killing the liability system. The liability
system will not remain intact until the last business disposes of its last asset.
It will collapse soon after the public realizes that it is ineffective-that
businesses can manipulate the amounts of their legal liabilities simply by
shuffling a few papers at the appropriate time and that substantial numbers of
businesses are doing so.
II. How COMMERCIAL FIRMS WILL BECOME JUDGMENT PROOF
A. Contracting Parties Will Not Protect the Tort Creditors
At a number of places in his essay, White makes variants of a single, basic
argument: Debtors cannot judgment proof their businesses because third parties
who contract with them will require, as a condition of that contracting, that the
debtor purchase liability insurance or maintain unencumbered assets.58 He is
correct that some lenders currently require that debtors maintain specified
ratios of assets to liabilities, some hospitals currently require that affiliated
doctors maintain liability insurance, and some unions currently concern
57. White, supra note 8, at 1363 n.2.
58. See White, supra note 8, at 1369, 1395-1396, 1408.
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themselves with acts that affect the future solvency of the company. In each
case, the third party assures the availability of unencumbered assets or
insurance to which future tort creditors can look for their recoveries.
Means exist, however, by which contract creditors can protect themselves
without protecting tort creditors. The relative costs of these alternatives are
declining as computerization brings down the cost of complex contracting. 9
These alternatives will soon outstrip conventional forms because all parties to
the alternative contracts can share in the savings achieved by externalizing the
liability of one or more of them. No value need be "wasted" by permitting it
to spill over in favor of the unrepresented future tort creditors.
I. Contracting Parties
The typical bank lender to a small business does not require the owner to
contribute sufficient equity to the corporation to assure repayment of the loan.
Instead, the typical bank lender protects itself by obtaining the personal
guarantees of the owners of the debtor corporation, leaving other creditors of
the corporation-including the future tort creditors-to fend for themselves. If
the corporation is large and its shares widely dispersed, securing the personal
guarantees of the owners may be impractical. Even in that situation, though,
the corporation can assure contracting parties of payment through the guarantee
of another corporation in the group, the purchase of a letter of credit in favor
of the contracting party, or the purchase of payment insurance.
The financing of Rockefeller Center prior to its Chapter II reorganization
in May 1995 illustrates the use of these techniques. The land and buildings
constituting Rockefeller Center were owned by two partnerships, referred to
collectively as Rockefeller Center Properties (RCP). The partners were two
private corporations, Rockefeller Group, Inc. and Rockefeller Center Music
Hall Productions, Inc., that were in turn owned by unnamed members of the
Rockefeller family and Mitsubishi Estate Company, Inc. Rockefeller Center
was appraised at $1.25 billion in 1994. The ownership structure was hard
judgment proofed by a mortgage in the amount of approximately $1.3 billion
in favor of Rockefeller Center Properties, Inc. (RCPI), a public corporation that
apparently was created to and did deal at arm's length with RCP.' If White's
theory were correct, RCPI would have required that RCP maintain a cushion
of equity and thereby have served as a "guardian of corporate solvency."6'
Instead, RCPI required that RCP furnish a letter of credit in the amount of $50
59. See LoPucki, supra note 12. at 47-51.
60. See ROCKEFELLER CTR. PROPERTIES. INC.. FORM 10-K FOR ThE YEAR EDiG D:-CEMBER 31.
1995, at 6 (1996). At least as of that filing. RCPI had no interest in Rockefeller Group. Inc See il at 12
61. See White. supra note 8. at 1412 ("[Contrac, creditors and other guardians of corporate olvcocy
may be even more watchful of private than of public companies ")
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million-solely for the benefit of RCPI.62
Had portions of Rockefeller Center toppled into the streets of New York
and caused billions of dollars in damages while this structure was in place, the
judgment creditors probably could not have reached either the value of
Rockefeller Center or the wealth of the Rockefeller family and the Mitsubishi
Estate. Under the principle of subordination,63 the value of Rockefeller Center
belonged first to the secured creditor that loaned money at arm's length; the
Rockefeller family and Mitsubishi were protected by corporate limited liability.
In Compustat data, Rockefeller Center appears innocuous. The judgment-
proof RCP was a private partnership owned by private corporations. None of
these private corporations filed 10-K forms, so none was included in
Compustat. The traditionally financed mortgagee, RCPI, was a public
corporation included in Compustat. It obtained its financing through a blend
of secured debt, unsecured debt, and equity in proportions considered
appropriate for public corporations. Because all of the liability involved in
owning and operating Rockefeller Center was generated on the private side of
this structure, and virtually all of the capital was contributed on the public side,
the resulting structure was elegantly judgment proof. That structure
demonstrates again the futility of trying to prove the absence of judgment
proofing in the American economy with nothing but Compustat data.
2. Contract-Required Insurance
In The Death of Liability, I observed in passing that if a building
construction contract were well-drafted, the subcontractor's ability to discharge
its future tort liabilities in Chapter 11 could, from the standpoint of the
contractor, be an adequate substitute for liability insurance.64 In reply, White
states that he finds it hard "to imagine a world in which firms are judgment
proof and Chapter 11 is less expensive and less stigmatizing than
insurance. '65 Yet the world White cannot imagine is, with respect to a large
proportion of all liability, the world in which we live. Numerous businesses
and individuals that could afford to insure against bankruptcy-threatening risks
deliberately choose not to. In the past, they have included the Manville Corp.
for risk in excess of $700 million, Texaco for the entire risk of tortious
interference, and the tobacco industry for products liability risk.66
White correctly points out that the costs of Chapter 11, direct and indirect,
are high. For large public corporations, they are probably in excess of 10% of
62. See ROCKEFELLER CTR. PROPERTIES, INC., supra note 60, at 80.
63. See LoPucki, supra note 12, at II.
64. See id. at 76-77.
65. White, supra note 8, at 1383.
66. See the sources cited in Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's Bargain, 80 VA. L. REv.
1887, 1906 n.81 (1994).
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the value of the company.67 But White errs when he compares the cost of a
Chapter 11 case with the cost of an insurance policy to decide whether
externalizing one's liability through judgment proofing is less costly than
paying one's liability through insurance. For every self-insuring company
forced into Chapter 1I, dozens or hundreds of self-insuring companies are not.
Most self-insuring companies encounter only small amounts of tort liability,
and pay it. Among those that encounter large tort liabilities, most will be able
to settle in the shadow of bankruptcy without having to file. To compare the
cost of Chapter 1 to the cost of insurance accurately, one must discount the
cost of Chapter 11 for the probability Chapter 11 will actually be necessary.
In a world in which every company is judgment proof, forcing a tort recovery
will be impossible. Tort actions will be rare in such a world, and Chapter I I
filings rarer.
3. Codefendants
In arguing that potential codefendants will require that debtors carry
liability insurance, White uses the example of a hospital, an anesthesiologist,
and a surgeon who might be sued jointly for a botched operation. He
concludes that the three will agree that the surgeon must insure."
Though hospitals commonly impose such requirements today, that
consequence too flows merely from the current costs of contracting as well as
public and customer relations considerations. Absent those considerations,
hospitals and doctors will tend to adopt the contracting scheme that minimizes
their total costs, enabling them to divide the benefits among them. When
contracting costs are low, the schemes that minimize total costs for the
hospitals and doctors are ones that externalize their tort liability. Absent public
and customer relations considerations,69 the hospital's lowest cost response
is not to require the doctor to carry malpractice insurance, but to make the
hospital's own operations judgment proof.
Even if the hospital cannot become judgment proof, the hospital will not
require the physician to insure. To understand why, assume (1) that all
physicians are judgment proof; (2) that no hospitals are judgment proof; (3)
that all malpractice is committed by physicians; and (4) that for any incident
67. See Gregor Andrade & Steven N. Kaplan. How Costly Is Financial (Not Economic) DistressI
Evidence from Highly Leveraged Transactions That Become Distressed 5 (July 1997) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (estimating the direct and indirect costs of financial distrecs at 'an aserage
of 10% with an upper bound of 24%").
68. See White, supra note 8. at 1407.
69. Despite such considerations, many hospitals and physicians attempt to contract out of iheir
malpractice liability through "'releases" signed by their patients. They encounter, howeser only mixed
success. See A.M. Swarthout. Annotation. Valdir and Constniction of Contract Errinptig Hospital or
Doctor from Liability for Negligence to Patent,. 6 A.L.R.3d 704 (1966). Judgment proofing is still less
likely to offend patients for the simple reason that the patients are less likely to know about it until it is
too late.
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of malpractice, the chance of being held liable is 80% for physicians and 40%
for the hospitals. If the aggregate level of malpractice is $100, the system will
cost the responsible hospitals $40 and judgment-proof physicians nothing. If
the hospitals accept Professor White's suggestion to require the physicians to
insure, the direct cost to physicians will be $80 and the direct costs to hospitals
will be zero.
But why would the hospitals impose $80 of liability on their associated
physicians in order to save only $40 for themselves? Both hospitals and
physicians would be better off in a relationship in which the hospitals waived
the requirement of malpractice insurance in return for a payment of $60. That
scheme would cost the physicians only $60. From that $60, the hospital could
pay the $40 of liability unjustly imposed upon them, leaving the hospital with
a "profit" of $20.
Patients would likely favor this solution as well. In a full-insurance regime,
they would be protected by $80 in malpractice insurance. That $80, however,
would tend to be added to the cost of medical services and therefore to the
costs of health insurance. Each patient would tend to pay his or her pro rata
share of the $80 cost of a full insurance regime. Most of that money would not
be paid out to patients in benefits, but would be consumed in the process of
determining fault.70 Assuming that the quality of care would not be worse in
a judgment-proof hospital,7 an individual patient would be better off going
to a judgment-proof hospital and buying first-party insurance that would
compensate the patient for bad results regardless of whether they were caused
by malpractice.72
If first-party insurance combined with peer review is a more cost-effective
solution to the malpractice problem than the liability system, why do so many
hospitals still impose the liability system on their physicians? Perhaps because
the law restricts the ability of the hospital, the physician, and the patient to
contract out of the liability system directly.73 The indirect means of
contracting out-becoming judgment proof-remain stigmatized. But, as I
explained in The Death of Liability, that is merely a cultural preference that in
the long run economic forces will overwhelm.74
70. For example, from 1987 to 1996, allocated and unallocated expense payments by insurers were
about 38% of the total net paid on medical malpractice claims. See BEST'S AGGREGATES, supra note 54,
at 165 (providing data forming the basis of this calculation). Probably, most plaintiffs also paid their
attorneys percentages of the net recovery ranging from about 25% to 50%.
71. Though radical-sounding, this assumption may be warranted because tort law causes the dangerous
practices of "defensive medicine" and is generally regarded as an inefficient means for deterring wrongful
conduct. See the sources cited in LoPucki, supra note 12, at 97 n.37. Alternative means of deterrence
include the investigation and publication of peer reviews.
72. Cf Mark Geistfeld, The Political Economy of Neocontractual Proposals for Products Liability
Reform, 72 TEX. L. REV. 803, 811 (1994) ('The administrative costs of insurance delivered through tort
law are vastly greater than the administrative costs of any first-party insurance regime.").
73. See Swarthout, supra note 69, at 705 (discussing the general rule that "persons may not contract
against the effect of their own negligence").
74. See LoPucki, supra note 12, at 51-54.
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B. Subsidiaries
Professor White tries to persuade the reader that subsidiaries are used
principally for purposes other than limiting liability: meeting the requirements
of foreign investment laws, engaging in regulated businesses domestically,
making every division head a CEO, and "segregating" a business to "more
readily identify[] and calculat[e] its success or failure."" By choosing the
example of Union Carbide, with 60% of its subsidiaries incorporated abroad,
he conveys the impression that most subsidiaries are foreign. In fact, probably
not more than about 20% of the subsidiaries of large U.S. publicly held
companies are foreign.76 Probably, few subsidiaries conduct regulated
businesses that require separate incorporation. Companies can award the title
of "Chief Executive Officer" without separately incorporating the division and
can segregate the business for accounting purposes without segregating it
through separate incorporation. Limiting liability is widely understood to be the
principal reason for the separate incorporation of subsidiaries. 77
Professor White is correct in thinking that the methods of parent-subsidiaryjudgment proofing he suggests would not be effective. He suggests that a
parent corporation create a judgment-proof subsidiary by transferring the assets
of a profitable but risky business to the subsidiary free and clear.7' The
subsidiary would be subject to control by the parent and the parent would be
"inevitably involved with the acts of Ithel subsidiary in perpetuating mass
torts. 79 If the subsidiary were profitable, it would be "routinely drain[ed] . ..
of its assets"8° by "distribut[ing the profits] upstream in the form of
dividends" to the parent."
I suspect that Professor White does not intend that we take his instructions
for judgment proofing literally. More likely, he intends to assert that no matter
how skillfully corporations judgment proof themselves, courts will protect the
tort claimants and the liability system itself by disingenuously seizing upon
some imagined flaw in the structure as an excuse for ignoring it.' -
75. White, supra note 8, at 1391.
76. To estimate the percentage of foreign subsidiane,. I counted both the foreign and domestic
subsidiaries in the 10 most recent groups to file under Chapter I I of the Bankruptcy Code. %elected on the
following criteria: large companies that state the places of incorporation of their subsidianes in their most
recent 10-K listed and available in LEXIS, COMPNY LibrarN. ACCESS File (Jan 28. 1998) The ten
groups had 333 subsidiaries. 58 (17%) of which were foreign
77. See the sources cited in LoPucki. supra note 12. at 21 n 78
78. See White, supra note 8. at 1391 ("If substantial assets are left in the subsidiar) those assets
will be available for tort claimants as well as others "'): id at 1400 'If the parent's tssts must be put into
the subsidiary to do its business, then those assets are at nsk
79. Id. at 1400.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1391: see also id. at 1403 ("To keep a profitable ,ubsidia, judgment proof requires that
profits be distributed routinely to the parent as dividends so that the earmings are not aailablc to tor and
other claimants.").
82. Professor White suggests this disingenuousness iheor) most strongly in his dscriptison of
subsidiaries and affiliates in notorious tort cases In each of the cises lie describes, the judgment proofing
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Though such disingenuousness may correct egregious overreaching in
obvious cases, it cannot substitute for rules that define overreaching and
communicate that standard to judges. Professor White not only understands the
need for bright line rules and certainty in commercial law, he is also their
leading advocate. 3 Commercial deal-making depends on the existence of
simple, reliable rules, which judges and legal communities supply.' The ad
hoc system Professor White imagines does not exist and could not be made to
work.
The judgment proofing that kills liability will be more sophisticated than
White envisions. Its architects will put it in place before the subsidiary incurs
any debt, rendering most of fraudulent conveyance law inapplicable. The
subsidiary will not own the fixed assets used in the business; it will lease them
from the parent at market rates. If the courts do not honor those leases, the
next round of leases will be negotiated at arms' length with third-party owners.
The parent will not control the subsidiary directly. Instead, a board of directors
elected by the parent as shareholder will control it. If the board chooses to
integrate the business of the subsidiary with that of the parent, it will do so by
contract negotiated with the best interests of the subsidiary in mind. The parent
will avoid involvement in the "grand torts" of the subsidiary. The subsidiary
will hire and train its own employees. If economies of scale can be achieved
by training employees of the subsidiary along with employees of other
members of the corporate group, that training program will be in a separate
subsidiary for whose malfeasance no other group member will be liable. No
shipping subsidiary will inflict liability on its parent by carrying oil owned by
the parent; the subsidiary will purchase the oil before loading it, and sell it
only upon unloading it. The numerous transactions, within the corporate group
and with its regular trading partners, will be fully documented and
administered by the corporate group's computers.
Revenues will flow from risky subsidiaries by a variety of means. The
bulk of the flow will be payment on the leased assets used in the business.
One of those assets probably will be the trademark of the parent. 85 Revenues
will be used to pay for services provided by the parent, including the
failed because of some seemingly obvious error on the part of the parent corporation that future judgment
proofers could easily avoid. See id. at 1391-1393.
83. See General Elec. Co. v. Halmar Distrib. (In re Halmar Distrib., Inc.), 968 F.2d 121, 125 (1st Cir.
1992) (quoting White's view that it is "'[bletter to leave an occasional widow penniless by the harsh
application of the law than to disrupt thousands of other transactions by injecting uncertainty and by
encouraging swarms of potential litigants and their lawyers to challenge what would otherwise be clear and
fair rules"' (quoting James J. White, in JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 26-20, at 554-55 (3d ed. 1988))).
84. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers' Heads, 90 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1498, 1516-21 (1996) (explaining the process by which legal communities render otherwise
indeterminate law determinate in practice).
85. Cf infra text accompanying note 120 (explaining how trademarks can be isolated from associated
liability).
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computerized information system that ties the corporate group together.
Because the subsidiary owns nothing and pays as it goes for nearly everything
it uses, the bills will be large and will tend automatically to approximate the
revenues. Only in those periods when the revenues of the subsidiary greatly
exceed the use value of the assets it employs will the subsidiary have to
distribute revenues to its parent in the form of dividends. Simply by declaring
those dividends publicly, the subsidiary can assure that four years after they
are paid they are immune from attack under fraudulent transfer law. '
Professor White warns of the many practices that courts consider grounds
for piercing the corporate veil.87 But the sophisticated judgment proofer need
not engage in those practices. The only exception is that the judgment proofer
must risk to some degree "inadequate capitalization." Judgment proofing
accomplishes nothing unless it prevents the recovery of judgments. The
uncollectibility of any judgment demonstrates that the business was in fact
capitalized at a level inadequate to pay its debts, raising the possibility that a
court could pierce the corporate veil and hold the parent liable on that ground.
The risk of such piercing is not great. The courts recognize that some
inadequacy of capitalization to satisfy the corporation's liabilities must be
tolerated.88 To hold otherwise would nullify the doctrine of corporate limited
liability. In practice, the courts defer to corporate limited liability to such an
extent that undercapitalization "[v]ery rarely, if at all" leads to disregard when
other grounds are not present."9 Professor Robert Thompson reports that of
the 1572 veil-piercing cases he studied, only 226 were tort cases, the court
pierced in only seventy of them,"° and the court cited undercapitalization as
a ground for the decision in only nine. 9' Both the law and practice remain as
the Eighth Circuit recently described them:
The doctrine of limited liability is intended precisely to protect a
parent corporation whose subsidiary goes broke. That is the whole
purpose of the doctrine, and those who have the right to decide such
86. Under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. the statute of limtatitons on an action to recoser a
fraudulent transfer is no longer than 'four years after the transfer .as made " UNtF FRALDLt. tx-'r
TRANSFER AcT § 9, 7A U.L.A. 665 (1985): see abo Unted States % Neidorf. 522 F2d 916 (9th Cir 1975)
(holding that a six-year statute of limitations for the reco .ery of di'idends fraudulently transferred to
shareholders had run and that the dividends could not be reco.ered) The public announcement assures that
the alternative period of limttations, "'one year after the transfer ,,as or could reasonably have been
discovered," will run earlier. UNIF. FRALIDILEN r TRANSFER ACT § 9-
87. See White, supra note 8, at 1401-1402.
88. See, e.g., Alberto v. Diversified Group. Inc.. 55 F3d 201. 206-07 (5th Cir 1995) (holding that a
corporation that left S58 million of tort judgments against it unsatisfied was adequatel, capitalized because
the purchasers of the corporation had invested S2.4 million and agreed to invest an additional S2 million)
89. ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 74 (1986)
90. See Robert B. Thompson. Piercing the Corporate VeI An EmpIrtIl Stids. 76 CORNELL L REV
1036. 1058 (1991).
91. See id. at 1066.
The Yale Law Journal
questions, that is, legislatures, believe that the doctrine, on the whole,
is socially reasonable and useful.92
C. Fraudulent Conveyance Law
White acknowledges that fraudulent conveyance laws are useless against
judgment proofing by security interest or asset securitization.93 He
nevertheless finds comfort in the fact that "the corporation has not succeeded
in hiding any assets: It still has the proceeds of the sale as assets. 94 Professor
White then proceeds to another topic, without responding to the point I made
in The Death of Liability regarding those proceeds: The corporation is unlikely
to retain the proceeds in cash. Either it will distribute them to shareholders, in
which case they are beyond the reach of future tort creditors, or it will invest
them in the business, in which case the size of the business, and presumably
its capacity to generate liability, will be increased. The effect is a kind of soft
judgment proofing, because the company's ratio of assets to potential liabilities
has been reduced.95
D. Government and Consumer Reaction
In The Death of Liability, I argued that judgment proofing will prove
impossible to eradicate because the principles on which it is based are so
deeply rooted in American culture.96 Nevertheless, I recognized that the
American public would not tolerate the open, deliberate, hard judgment
proofing of the largest corporations. I concluded that to succeed, "the process
of judgment proofing must appear to be something other than what it is" and
suggested how that might occur.97
Current events in the tobacco industry illustrate the point. Professor White
takes heart from the fact that Phillip Morris and RJR Nabisco, both facing
monumental liabilities, have not spun off their food subsidiaries98 and is
confident that "the tobacco divisions of B.A.T., R.J. Reynolds, or Phillip
Morris are so richly endowed with assets that they would not be regarded as
judgment proof by any standard measure."9 9 In fact, there have already been
five spinoffs in the tobacco industry, and both RJR Nabisco and Phillip Morris
92. Radaszewski v. Telecom Corp., 981 F.2d 305, 311 (8th Cir. 1992).
93. See White, supra note 8, at 1405.
94. Id.
95. See LoPucki, supra note 12, at 26.
96. See id. at 8-13.
97. Id. at 54.
98. See White, supra note 8, at 1406. After the Bhopal gas leak and before it settled the case, Union
Carbide went into a frenzy of spinoffs that some analysts considered judgment proofing. See Jonathan P.
Hicks, Carbide To Incorporate Its Three Key Businesses, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1988, at D4 (noting that
"some analysts" saw the move as an attempt to insulate the operating units from Bhopal liability).
99. White, supra note 8, at 1406 n.161.
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have faced pressure from investors to spin off as well.'" Even though the
only significant effect of these spinoffs would be to insulate better the assets
of the parent companies from the liabilities of their subsidiaries, the media do
not attribute the spinoff fever in the tobacco industry to judgment proofing. For
example, the article on which Professor White relies for his confidence in the
tobacco industry attributes the spinoff fever to the irrational and uninformed
preferences of investors who continue to think that a liability "'meltdown" is
a real possibility even while the stock analysts assure them it is not.'0 '
The corporate groups of which the tobacco companies are parts have
numerous subsidiaries. Even the tobacco subsidiaries are fragmented into
numerous sub-subsidiaries. 0 2 The financial disclosures required of the
tobacco companies, like those of other public companies, are consolidated for
the corporate group. From them, the reader cannot determine the assets or
liabilities of any particular corporation within the group. Even if no tobacco
subsidiary owned a single dollar of unencumbered assets, that would not
necessarily be inconsistent with the public disclosures. The tobacco companies
do disclose "identifiable assets" and revenues for the "tobacco segments" of
their businesses, but there is no assurance that the tobacco segment assets are
in the tobacco liability-generating subsidiaries. Moreover, the identifiable assets
reported for the tobacco segments of the four major tobacco companies, plus
the entire assets of the fifth, total only $36.1 billion, less than 10% of the
liabilities those companies have offered to pay.' Both the national tobacco
settlement and the settlements with the states release the parents of the tobacco
100. See Tobacco Giants Weigh Spinoffs To Boost Stock Prices. AP. Apr 16. 1994. titalabl it 1994
WL 5189529.
101. See Suein L. Hwang & Milo Geyelin. B.A T BAin Kick Tobacco tHabit Deipite Some Legal
Insulation, WALL ST. J.. Oct. 15, 1997. at B8 ("The truth is. holding companies currently ircn't in the line
of fire ....."), cited it White, supra note 8. at 1406 n 161. In fact. some plaintiffs alread) seek to pierce
the corporate veil of the tobacco subsidianes because the), anticipate their mnsol',cncy See. r g. Arch %
American Tobacco Co.. Civ. Act. No. 96-5903. 1997 U S. Dist. LEXIS 8699 (E-D Pa June 16. 1997)
(dismissing complaint against parent B.AT.): Mar)land % Philip Morms. Inc. No 96122017/CL211487.
1997 Md. LEXIS 85 (filed May 20, 1997) (naming parents of five major tobacco compane.sas defendants.i
102. For example, RJR Nabisco reports 269 subsidiaries. 92 of which hate RJ Renolds or RJR in
their names. See RJR NABISCO HOLDtNGS CORP. FORM 10-K FOR nIlE YEAR EniG DLzutstntR 3 I, 199
exh.21 (1997), available in LEXIS, COMPNY Library. ACCESS File. Twenty-three of thosca .re Dcl.ae
corporations. See id.
103. The identifiable assets of the tobacco segments are Philip Moms. $13 3 billion, see PlItIP
MORRIS COS. INC.. FORM 10-K FOR TIE YEAR END,\G DICiu.%IBER 31. 1996 at note 10 (1997). aailaible
in LEXIS. COMPNY Library. ACCESS File: RJR Nabisco. S19 billion, see RJR NABIISCo IIoDGS
CORP., FORM 10-K FOR THE YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31. 1996 at note 14 (1997). aathble in LEXIS.
COMPNY Library, ACCESS File: Loews. S 7 billion. see LOEWS CORP. FORM, 10-K iOR It[ YEAR
ENDtNG DECEMBER 31, 1996 at note 20 (1997). atailable in LEXIS. COMPNY Librar,. ACCESS File.
Brooke Group, Ltd., S. 1 billion, see BROOKE GROUP LrD.. FORM 10-K Foit nt. Yt-AR ENDiNG DL(*[- .tBLR
31, 1996 at note 18 (1997). available in LEXIS. COMPNY Library. ACCESS File The Ifith. Bro.n &
Williamson Tobacco Company. has about S3 billion in assets, but imost or all of that may be encumbered
See DUN'S BUSINESS RECORDS PLUS. BUStNESS INFORMATION REPORT ON BHto%%% & WILIIx.tsO%
TOBACCO CORP. 13 (1998). Dun & Bradstreet reports Brown & \Vilharnson as has.mg a net .,orih of about
S683 million, which Dun & Bradstreet has for unexplained reasons adjusted to a negati',e S366 million
See id. at I, 12. The face amount of the tobacco settlement is $368.5 billion payable oer 25 years See
Mohammad Akhter, Expanding a Deadly Etport Busiess. WASH POST. Sept 11. 1997. at A 1S
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companies from liability, leaving only the tobacco subsidiaries liable. °4
Approval of the settlement by Congress would be the linchpin in the most
daring judgment-proofing scheme in history.0 5 The belief currently
prevailing-that even as hundreds of millions of dollars in tort claims move
toward trial the tobacco industry is not attempting to limit its exposure-has
no sound basis in publicly available data. ' 6 Thus does the judgment proofing
of the tobacco industry appear to be something other than it is.
In the context of products like tobacco or asbestos, Professor White's
argument that companies will not judgment proof out of concern for their
image t°7 reaches the level of the absurd. When Manville executives learned
that their product might be deadly, they concealed that information and
continued to sell asbestos for more than a decade while disposing of their
asbestos holdings.'0 8 The tobacco industry sells a product that contributes to
the deaths of over 420,000 Americans a year.'" The industry continued to
deny that its product was implicated in those deaths long after the American
public ceased to believe it."0 Professor White would have us believe that the
people who have done these things would shrink from judgment proofing out
of fear for their good names."'
E. Mandatory Insurance
In The Death of Liability, I predicted political resistance to requiring
insurance or bonds of all participants in the economy because such a
104. See Tobacco Settlement § VI(b)(6) (visited June 25, 1997) <http://www.usatodaycom/ncws/
smoke/smoke06.htm>, at 35 ("Obligation for annual payments responsibility only of entities selling into
domestic market."); Florida Settlement Agreement at I1(C)(2) (Aug. 25, 1997) (visited Feb. 2, 1998) <http:II
stic.neu.edu/Fl/flsettle.htm> (providing that, upon final approval of the settlement by the court, "the State
of Florida shall release and forever discharge all Defendants and their present and former parents,
subsidiaries, divisions, affiliates, directors, employees, representatives, insurers, agents, attorneys, and
distributors").
105. 1 have argued elsewhere that if the settlement is approved the tobacco companies are not so likely
to use their judgment-proof status to avoid payment as they are to use it as leverage to extract further
concessions from government. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Some Settlement, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1998, at A 15.
106. Gary Black, widely regarded as the leading tobacco stock analyst, told me he does not have
access to data indicating which assets are owned by which subsidiaries. Telephone Interview with Gary
Black, Stock Analyst, Sanford, Bernstein (Nov. 18, 1997).
107. See White, supra note 8, at 1411.
108. See Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
109. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarenes: The Economic Case for lr Post
Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1167 & n. I (1998).
110. See id. at 1194-96.
Ill. Of course, they might shrink from judgment proofing at the same time that they did not shrink
from intentional mass torts if the nonlegal sanctions for the former were greater than those for the latter.
See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1990)
(discussing the importance of reputation and conscience as factors compelling contractual compliance).
Judgment proofing is, however, highly technical, with the result that, as a practical matter, nonlegal
sanctions are virtually nonexistent in the United States. As a test of this proposition, try to think of an
instance in which judgment proofing was sanctioned nonlegally. Union Carbide is certainly an example in
which it was not.
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Virtual Judgment Proofing
requirement would bar the least-well-off segment of society from the
traditional means of advancement: going into business for oneself." Based
largely on the analogy to automobile insurance. I concluded that a mandatory
insurance regime could require only low limits of insurance and would still
remain difficult to enforce."13 Misunderstanding the enforcement problem,
Professor White proposes that businesses be required to attach proof of
insurance to their tax returns." 4 To solve the problem of the low limits of
coverage characteristic of nearly all mandatory insurance regimes, he proposes
higher limits enforced by punitive premiums and criminal sanctions.
But the problem with mandatory automobile liability insurance is not
merely one of discovering violators. White is probably correct in thinking that
a determined government could discover violators of a compulsory insurance
law. But in California, nearly a third of the population violates the mandatory
insurance law while their political representatives fight against particular
enforcement mechanisms because they would be effective." 6 The notion that
one might need the approval of an insurance company to go into business for
oneself is no more politically acceptable than the notion that one might need
the approval of an insurance company to drive a car.
III. VIRTUAL JUDGMENT PROOFING
The computerization of contracting is driven by forces much larger than
the desire to avoid liability. For years, analysts have been predicting the advent
of virtual companies-companies that literally consist of nothing but a web of
contractual relationships. Instead of setting up its own data processing,
"customer service, telemarketing, billing and collection, purchasing, employee
training, accounting, publishing, legal administration and so on," the virtual
company will "outsource" these functions-that is, contract with others to
provide them:
Let's take, for an example, an airline. A handful of strategists put
their heads together to decide where to fly and what to charge. As
with many airlines these days, they lease their aircraft and hire flight
and ground crews on contract. But then they hit the networks to find
vendors for just about all other operations-passenger reservations,
baggage tracking, accounting, aircraft loading, weather monitoring,
route planning and seat-revenue maximizing. Almost overnight,
they're flying." 7
112. See LoPucki, supra note 12. at 85-89.
113. See id. at 80-85.
114. See White, supra note 8, at 1387.
115. See id. at 1385.
116. See LoPucki, supra note I. at 86 n.362. 87 n.366
117. Ralph T. King Jr., The Virtual Companv. When Is a Compatna Not a Compans I When It's us a
Box, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1994, at R12.
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Because the virtual company does not own the resources it commandeers, it
is born judgment proof. Even if it is highly profitable, a liberal dividend policy
will keep it judgment proof without running afoul of the law.
Alternatively, a virtual company can take on the role of a company that
owns things, but does not do things. Sara Lee was recently hailed by the Wall
Street Journal as the first virtual company.18 Sara Lee plans to outsource the
manufacturing of its products and become merely a distributor. To accomplish
that, the company is selling its manufacturing operations."19 That move alone
will not relieve Sara Lee of liability for its products. But it would be only a
short step further for Sara Lee to contract for the sale and distribution of its
products by others. Sara Lee's sole assets would then be the trademarks and
contract rights. The new Restatement (Third) of Torts makes clear that such a
company would not be liable to purchasers of products bearing the company's
trademark provided that the company did not participate substantially in the
design, manufacture, or distribution of the product. 2 ' The no-name
subcontractors who manufactured and distributed for Sara Lee could judgment
proof themselves to the limit of the law, without concern for public relations.
They would be invisible to Sara Lee's customers in the ordinary operation of
the business, just as was the franchisee in Mobil Oil v. Bransford.'2' They
would emerge from the shadows only to show their empty pockets in litigation.
Neither Sara Lee nor its subcontractors would have to pay products liability
claims. 1
22
The specter of judgment proofing and the specter of the virtual company
are one and the same, and the specter is advancing. White's rallying cry,
"Liability lives,"' 123 remains accurate. But for how long?
118. See Lowenstein, supra note I.
119. See id.
120. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUcTS LIABILITY § 14 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft
1997) (stating that "the [trademark] licensor, who does not sell or otherwise distribute products, is not liable
under this Section of this Restatement"); Yoder v. Honeywell Inc., 104 F.3d 1215, 1222-24 (10th Cir. 1997)
(holding a parent company not liable for defective products manufactured and sold by its subsidiary under
the trademark of the parent company).
121. 648 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1995); see supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
122. This does not necessarily mean that Sam Lee or its subcontractors would be any less concerned
with the quality of their products. They would still have to sell them and maintain the good will of the
customers who buy them.
123. White, supra note 8, at 1412.
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